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When the then new Army/Marine Corps’ counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine was fielded in 2006, it
quickly earned the label of “The Book” on Iraq and, later, Afghanistan. At the time this writer (among
others) offered critiques of it which were not just ignored, but openly ridiculed.
Given the gloomy outcomes of the wars in both places, one would have thought that a doctrinal reassessment of that 2006 approach would have unsparingly sought to figure out what worked and what did
not, and revised accordingly. With few exceptions, however, the just released Field Manual (FM) 324/Marine Corp Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies (28
April 2014) does not reflect that kind of searching inquiry. Instead, the “new” doctrine is mostly just a
somewhat updated and re-organized version of the same 2006 formula.
To be sure, there was much goodness in the 2006 manual, and a lot of that rightfully carries over into the
revised FM 3-24. Of course, there are instances where, like its predecessor, the new doctrine seems to restate the obvious. No doubt it is easy to become impatient with the new (actually, any) doctrine when
confronted with repeated themes, but the reader should remember that it is designed for use by those who
have not necessarily experienced all the events of the post-9/11 era. Doctrine documents, especially those
with ambition for longevity, should assume readers with little or no familiarity with the material it
addresses.
Still, the new doctrine represents - regrettably - a missed opportunity. Recent fears about the lessons of
Iraq and Afghanistan being forgotten are, in a way perhaps unintended, well-founded: the right lessons
are being forgotten. Even worse, the wrong ones are being memorialized in documents like the new FM
3-24. What was needed was a fundamental rethinking of a land force approach to COIN in light of wars
whose results are not just decidedly “unsatisfying” to military professionals, but also so disappointing to
the American people that they now overwhelming believe the war in Afghanistan was not worth fighting,
and a growing majority (52%) have concluded that the U.S. mostly failed in Iraq.
In fairness, part of the problem of incorporating the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, writ large, is beyond
the purview of any doctrine manual writers: in Iraq, a counterinsurgency approach was employed to
address what was, originally anyway, a counter-terrorism problem.
How did this happen? The thinking seems to have been that in order to prevent another attack like 9/11
(or worse, a WMD-enhanced strike), it was necessary to deprive terrorists of their bases and/or nationstate support. The “solution” therefore was to revamp entire countries vulnerable to being “hosts” for
terrorist entities into economically-stable, Western-style democracies which, presumably, would be

decisively inhospitable to any terrorists who could threaten America or the rest of the world.
The execution of this herculean task fell (either deliberately or by default) principally to U.S. and allied
military forces. As absurd as it seems, decision-makers also thought, evidently, that the societal
transformations they deemed so essential could be accomplished in a relatively short timeframe, and at an
acceptable cost in blood and treasure. Quite obviously, there were an abundance of mistaken assumptions
in this approach, but it was enthusiastically implemented anyway.
As a result, it was not long before senior civilian and military leaders found themselves spouting such
bromides as the mission in Iraq and/or Afghanistan was to “protect the [host nation] people”. In truth, the
real mission, indeed the entire rationale for the war, was to protect the American people. That critical
truth somehow got lost in the implementation of the 2006 doctrine, if not before.
Furthermore, the 2006 doctrine claimed that David Galula (a 1950s French officer and much ballyhooed
as a counterinsurgency expert), had “wisely” noted that each “soldier must then be prepared to become…a
social worker, a civil engineer, a schoolteacher, a nurse, [and] a boy scout.” Almost no one pointed out
the ridiculousness of creating such expectations for the quintessential, 19 year-old American infantryman
wielding a high school degree. How – indeed, why – should anyone have thought him able to accomplish
tasks so diverse and complex that they defied even highly-trained experts?
Regardless, it still should have been apparent from the beginning that even if the national makeovers the
decision-makers sought actually occurred, modern terrorists do not, in fact, need Iraq or Afghanistan as
bases to pursue their goals. There were – and are - plenty of other available options.
Think about it: was it really so hard to foresee how easily terrorists could set up shop in any number of
other troubled areas? Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen are just a few examples where they did just
that. In other words, the entire premise of revamping a particular country as being the (or even “an”)
answer to the challenge of suppressing terrorist threats to the U.S. has proven profoundly wrongheaded. It
is just too easy for terrorist organizations to outflank it. This does not mean that COIN has no utility in
countering terrorist operations; it simply means that it should be employed for that purpose only if clearly
supported by a scrupulously objective cost/benefit analysis.
Does history help? Yes, but only to a point. The current FM 3-24 – like its predecessor – does reflect a
far-reaching historical analysis of various counterinsurgencies. The post-World War II colonial wars, as
well as Cold War-influenced Vietnam War, figure prominently in both doctrines. In a sense, this is one of
their strengths as they do an excellent job at wringing doctrinal concepts from those conflicts. Military
history has virtues all its own, and some its lessons are indeed immutable.
However, the doctrine’s approach also reveals flaws – in this instance, fatal flaws – of too much reliance
on historical models. In the first place, the world has profoundly changed in the 40 to 50 years since the
conflicts upon which the doctrines so heavily (albeit not exclusively) rely. The rise of persistent, hightech surveillance, precision weaponry and, perhaps most importantly, a globalized, 24-hour news cycle
enhanced by the proliferation of social media techniques, are just a few of examples of the revolutionary
changes that have occurred. Any doctrinal document that fails to fully address these pivotal realities is, by
definition, deficient – at least insofar as the U.S. military is concerned.
Herein lies the central problem with the new FM 3-24: however doctrinally suitable it may be for a
generic counterinsurgency force – and it certainly may be exactly the right methodology for low-tech,
indigenous forces - it is simply not the optimal approach for the American military. The doctrine simply
does not adequately account for the technological culture of the U.S. and its armed forces. Colin Gray
insightfully observes that “High technology is the American way in warfare. It has to be. A high
technology society cannot possibly prepare for, or attempt to fight, its wars in any other than a
technology-led manner.

”
Yet much like its forerunner, the new FM 3-24 remains decidedly – if not proudly – low-tech. True, there
are a few desultory comments about, for example, cyber, but mainly as something insurgents might
exploit as opposed to a capability in which the U.S. enjoys real advantages. Overall, the anti-technology
flavor of the current doctrine’s predecessor mostly persists. For example, the 2006 manual was criticized
for marginalizing airpower into a five page section, but the current version reduces even that meager
treatment to a matter of just a few sentences, and largely dismisses it as a mere “enabler” of ground forces.
This makes it especially unfortunate that there was not more consideration of the role that technology has
played in the recent success that the Colombian military has enjoyed against the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC). The Washington Post reported last December that U.S.-supplied aircraftdelivered precision weapons “helped Colombian forces kill at least two dozen rebel leaders” leaving
the insurgency “at its smallest and most vulnerable state in decades.”
Likewise, another recent report concludes that drone strikes in Pakistan are, in fact, “associated with
decreases in the incidence and lethality of terrorist attacks, as well as decreases in particularly intimidating
and deadly terrorist tactics, including suicide and improvised explosive devices (IED) attacks.” Given
how IEDs bedeviled the Army and Marine Corps in Iraq and Afghanistan, these examples of how today’s
technology presents opportunities to effectively counter insurgent capabilities without excessively risking
ground troops should have been thoroughly investigated in the doctrine’s revision.
Regrettably, however, the “new” COIN doctrine seems stuck in a Cold War-era COIN model in which the
solution must involve deploying massive numbers of soldiers and/or Marines to hostile foreign soil. To be
sure, I am definitely not advocating a ‘technology ‘über alles’ approach but rather I am merely suggesting
that some of the fundamental premises of FM 3-24’s manpower-intensive, ground-centric approach
deserve to be better informed by the technological possibilities of the 21st century. By failing to give such
possibilities the opportunity they deserve, the new doctrine simply does not adequately align itself with
what is, like it or not, what Colin Gray calls the “American way in warfare.”
Philosophically, it is surprising to this writer that the Marine Corps adopts this doctrine lock, stock, and
barrel. One would think that the Corps’ dedication to air-ground integration, its expertise in the mobility
advantages inherent in amphibious warfare, as well as other differences based on the Corps’ experience
and service culture, might produce a distinct approach in at least a concept or two, but apparently not.
Likewise, would not, for example, the Army’s airborne capabilities or armor operations’ skills, generate
a couple of different ideas? This lack of differentiation may cause some to wonder: do we really need
two land forces doing COIN? Indeed, if there is no doctrinal difference in this kind of warfighting, will
people start questioning if America needs two land forces at all?
In any event, another key deficiency is the stubborn refusal of the doctrine to fully explore how the very
presence of American ground forces can be particularly problematic to a counterinsurgency effort. True,
the doctrine does mention, among a laundry list of causes of an insurgency, that the “presence of a foreign
force can be the root cause of an insurgency.” But this broad generalization grossly underplays the reality
that American forces specifically very often present complications for the host government far beyond the
considerable difficulties that any foreign troops can pose.
Plainly, the physical presence of large numbers of a superpower’s military on the ground in a country
creates certain issues fundamentally unlike those of the militaries of other countries, especially when there
is a historical, cultural and political chasm between the nations involved. The failure in a doctrine aimed
at U.S. ground forces to fully dissect the special complications associated with American boots-on-the
ground is no small defect.

The chapter entitled “Indirect Methods for Countering Insurgencies” is perhaps the most hopeful as it at
least opens the door to a smaller U.S. footprint approach, mainly by emphasizing working through the
host-nation and its forces. Although there is not as much creativity as one might hope, and the truth is that
the sort of “indirect” approach outlined could easily involve a lot of American troops, it is nevertheless a
step in the right direction. Big brains need to do more innovative thinking about the indirect approach to
COIN as the American people are extremely unlikely to countenance much in the way of large-footprint,
direct approaches in the foreseeable future. Let’s not forget that after Vietnam it was more than thirty
years – an entire generation of soldiers and Marines - before the U.S. military needed to “remember”
much about large, manpower-intensive COIN operations.
Of course, there are still plenty of important and valuable nuggets found in the new doctrine; indeed, the
problem is that there are so many so diffused it is difficult to find the key ones as there too often is too
little prioritization or contextual differentiation. While the doctrine does recognize different causes of
insurgencies, it does too little to align counters that might be especially effective (or ineffective) against
particular type. Moreover, the new doctrine does not appear to be sure if it wants to be a glorified
collection of tactics, techniques, and procedures for warfighters, or a cerebral examination of the
insurgency phenomena that could appeal, as was said of its predecessor, to “northeastern graduate
students,” that is, “a doctrine with particular appeal to people who would never own a gun.”
Additionally, apparently anxious to avoid being accused of leaving something out, the doctrine allows
almost every COIN-related hobby horse to make an appearance, typically without much scrutiny or
reflection. Thus, the controversial human terrain team (HTT) concept appears, but without
acknowledging the very serious criticism it has generated. (Should not FM 3-24 – or somebody –
explain why a well-trained intelligence officer could not perform the HTT function?) Similarly, while the
doctrine is spiked with ‘bumper sticker’ phrases like “whole of government” and “unified action
partners”, a thoughtful - and brutally frank - analysis is wanting. Example? What is – or should be - the
doctrinal approach when the rest of government fails to show up?
Additionally, so many qualifiers litter the doctrine’s landscape that the impact of significant concepts is
undermined. Too many “may” this or “may” that can make any document seem too tentative and
indecisive. Furthermore, important ideas can get confused. For example, the doctrine repeatedly calls for
a “capable” host government, but then drifts into something of a chicken versus egg conundrum as to
whether security permits a capable government to arise or a capable government is a prerequisite to a
secure environment. If the answer is in FM 3-24 somewhere, it needs to be clearer.
Most maddening is the reprise from the 2006 manual of the chic and popular but ultimately meaningless
“paradoxes” section. This is the rendition of a series of supposedly insightful phrases all premised with a
qualifier like “some” or “sometimes” (e.g., “Sometimes, the More Force Is Used, the Less Effective It Is”
and “Some of the Best Weapons for Counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot”). Of course, it is blindingly
obvious that almost anything can be said if one qualifies it with the words “some” or “sometimes.” What
then do you really have? While perhaps pleasing to linguistic fashionistas these no-context assertions are
of little practical value, and are so amorphous as to carry real potential to be counter-productive.
Tucked into the very end of the document is a chapter on “Legal Considerations.” It is, unfortunately, a
disappointing effort. It recites some perfunctory truisms about the law of armed conflict and related legal
matters, but falls short of providing any real doctrinal analysis. What, for example, is the doctrine when
the host nation and/or coalition partners are parties to international agreements that the U.S is not?
Conform to the treaties anyway? Moreover, what is the doctrine when the host nation and/or coalition
partners consider the insurgency not as matter governed by the law of armed conflict (as the U.S. is prone
to do), but rather as a law enforcement situation? What if such a view could markedly increase risks to

U.S, troops?
The most puzzling feature of this chapter is the curiously restrained discussion of force discipline. The
doctrine states simply that despite “rigorous selection and training, some personnel will commit
infractions requiring discipline.” “Infractions”? Seriously? Abu Ghraib, Haditha, and Mahmudiya – not
to mention SSgt Bales’ murderous rampage - were hardly “infractions.” What should have been explored
is how devastating criminal activity can be to the overall COIN effort, and provide some doctrinal
guidance as to how it might be robustly addressed.
Regardless, allow me to say this again definitively: there is much to commend about the new FM 3-24 (as
there was about its predecessor). It is a “must read” for anyone seriously interested in COIN.
That said, it would be a mistake to think that FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 is anything more than a land-centric
view. In fact, it explicitly states that the “U.S. Army and Marine Corps can prevent or defeat an
insurgency across the range of military operations.” No need, it seems, for the Air Force, Navy or Coast
Guard even though each has played a major role in the post-9/11 COIN efforts. As the doctrine barely
pays lip service to jointness, it is not an especially attractive basis for real-world implementation in the
next COIN challenge. One might hope that the recent Joint Publication 3-24 would fill that bill but it too
suffers from a lack of sufficient imagination.
All is not, however, lost. One of the central themes of the old FM 3-24, and repeated in the revised
version, is the importance of learning to adapt. This is the real value of John Nagl’s classic book
Learning to Eat Soup with Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malay and Vietnam that proved so
influential to the 2006 version of FM 3-24. Whatever may be the deficiencies of this or that aspect of new
FM 3-24, if we internalize the ability to creatively innovate, the American military will be well-served not
just in COIN situations, but across the entire spectrum of conflict.
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